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Governmental price regulation was practised at an early stage
in English legal history, and constituted an important element
in the economic life of the Middle Ages.1 It was an integral
part of a social order strongly influenced by ethical conceptions
of a just price capable of the same kind of objective determina-
tion as any other ethical standard.2  It was the natural ex-
pression of the prevailing idea that it was distinctly the busi-
ness of the state to regulate the conduct of trade, which itself
was a phase of the mediaeval respect for, and reliance upon,
authority.3 The ideas of that period were gradually supplanted
by those of an expanding individualism, which culminated in
the philosophic assumption of the classical economists that social
welfare was an inevitable by-product of competitive individual-
ism.4 This shift in ideas had its counterpart in changing gov-
ernmental practices that allowed business and trade an increas-
ingly larger field for self-determination. The Spencerian theory
of the function of government was in large measure realized
during a considerable portion of the nineteenth century, not only
in England but also in the United States where it found con-
genial soil in the conditions of an undeveloped and pioneer com-
munity. The ideas of the earlier period never completely dis-
appeared; and, during the very period when the theory of
laissez faire was in process of definite formulation, legislative
price fixing was being resorted to in the American colonies and
the field of price regulation was being judicially extended in
England.6 The most conspicuous case of survival was that of
the common carrier. The essential difference between the
earlier and later periods was one of emphasis. In the former,
governmental control was an integral part of an accepted social
r6gime; in the latter, it had acquired the character of an ex-
ceptional policy. Changing conditions resulted in a consider-
able revival of price control that began in this country during
1 Freund, Police Power (1904) 382; Cheadle, Government Control of Busi-
ness (1920) 20 COL. L. Rnv. 438, 550. NOTE AND COMMENT (1920) 19 Micni.
L. REV. 74; Gilmore, Governmental Regulation of Prices (1905) 17 GnMN
BAG, 627.
2 2 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (3d ed. 1923) 468.
3 4 Ibid. (1924) 386.
4 See generally, Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations; Ricardo, Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation, passim.
Freund, op. cit. supra note 1, at 384; NoTEs (1920) 33 HARv. L. Rzv.
838.
6 Allnutt v. Inglis (1810, K. B.) 12 East, 527.
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the latter third of the nineteenth century, and has proceeded at
an accelerated pace during the last two decades. It is the con-
stitutional problem involved in the legislative definition of the
field of economic activity liable to this type of control that con-
stitutes the subject matter of the present discussion. The prin-
ciples governing its judicial extension will not be considered.-
There are many forms of governmental regulation which in-
directly affect prices; and certain taxes do so directly. The term
"price control" will, however, be used in this discussion to in-
dicate those governmental regulations which not only operate
directly upon prices but are also adopted for the very purpoze
of producing that effect. The subsequent discussion of the prin-
ciples involved will be facilitated by a survey of the decisions
on its validity. Its first important extension was to the busi-
ness of grain elevation at commercial centers. This was soon
followed by applying the principle to the same business in a pre-
dominantly agricultural state where the conditions under which
it was conducted were radically different. The constitutionality
of these measures was sustained in both instances:, At about
the same time the legislative power to prescribe railroad rates
was definitely establishedP The extreme legislative activity in
this respect that characterized the Granger movement abated
somewhat after these decisions, although not until stochyards
had been subjected to price control., Then followed a brief
period of comparative quiescence, succeeded in turn by one of
increased legislative activity commencing near the close of the
first decade of the twentieth century and reaching its maximum
during and just after the war. The result was a considerable
expansion of the field of price control, and the definite exclusion
therefrom of certain types of economic activity. Its constitu-
tionality has been sustained, either by the United States Supreme
Court or by the highest court of various states, as applied to the
businesses of insurance, 1 carrying oil by pipe lines, 2 furnishing
7For discussion of these problems see Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar
Duties of Public Service Compi;zes (1911) 11 CoL. L. Rzv. 514, 616, 7413;
Wyman, The Law of the Public Caflhzgs as a Solution of the Tr-,~t Problem
(1904) 17 HARv. L. REv. 156, 217; Adler, Busihess J .sprudcwe (1914) 28
ARv. L. REv. 135.
8Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 U. S. 113; Brass v. North Dahota (189i)
153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857. For a discussion of the Mun caze, ec
Finkelnburg, The Power of the State to Regulato Prices and Charges (1893)
32 Am. L. Rnv. 501.
9 Peik- -o. Chicago & N. W. Ry. (1877) 94 U. S. 164.
10 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (1901) 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup.
Ct. 30.
1 Gernmn Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lcwmis (1914) 233 U. S. 089, 34 Sup.
Ct. 612.
1- The Pipe Line Cases (1914) 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 95G.
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electricity not directly to the public but to a utility that serves
the public,"13 distributing ice,14 cold storage warehousing," re-
selling theatre tickets, 6 thle selling of coal 7 and the renting of
dwellings and other buildings.18 The power to fix prices for fur-
nishing steam-heat went unchallenged in one case ;", and in an-
other, in which the Federal Supreme Court invalidated a rate
order because the statutes made no adequate provision for judi-
cial review, the power to regulate the prices of laundry services
seems to have been tacitly assumed.20  The power of the federal
government to fix coal prices as a war measure has been up-
held ;21 and, although the price-regulative provisions of the Lever
Act - - were held invalid because of the indefiniteness of the estab-
lished price standard,2 3 the federal power to control the prices
of necessaries therein provided for was sustained by various
lower federal courts as to several kinds of necessaries. 4 The
Supreme Court did not pass upon the validity of the Lever Act
in this respect. No more than a reference is required to the
governmental power to control prices in the field of the recog-
nized public utilities such as the railroads,25 telephone and tele-
13 Southern Oklahoma Power Co. v. Corporation Commission (1923) 96
Okla. 53, 220 Pac. 370.
14 Oklahoma Lt. & Power Co. v. Corporation Commission (1923) 96 Okla.
19, 220 Pac. 54.
15 Public Utility Commission v. The Monarch Refrigerating Co. (1915)
267 Ill. 528, 108 N. E. 716.
16 People v. Weller (1924) 237 N. Y. 316, 143 N. E. 205; aff'd in Weller
v. People (1925) 268 U. S. 319, 45 Sup. Ct. 556 (but without considering
power to fix prices); Inre Opinion of the Justices (1924) 247 Mass. 589, 143
N. E. 808. See (1924) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 434; NOTES AND COMMENT
(1924) 9 CORN. L. QUART. 321; NOTES (1924) 37 HAiV. L. Ruv. 1125.
'7-American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Comm. of Iued.
(1920, D. C. Ind.) 268 Fed. 563.
18 Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458; Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman (1921) 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465. See Boyd, Rent
Regulation under the Police Power (1921) 19 MIcH. L. REV. 599; Wickerg.
ham, The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws (1921) 69
U. PA. L. REV. 301; Smith, ThO Granger Cases (1924) 10 A. B. A. Joun. 343.
19 State ex rel. Cass v. Public Service Comm. (1923) 298 Mo. 303, 249
S. W. 955.
20 Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love (1920) 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338.
21 United States v. Pennsylvania Central Coal Co. (1918, W. D. Pa.) 256
Fed. 703.22 Act of Oct. 22, 1919 (41 Stat. at L. 297, 298).
23 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co. (1921) 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup. Ct.
298.
24 United States v. Spokane Dry Goods Co. (1920, E. D. Wash.) 264 Fed.
209; United States v. Cohen Grocer Co. (1920, E. D. Mo.) 264 Fed. 218;
C. A. Weed & Co. v. Lockwood (1920, W. D. N. Y.) 264 Fed. 453; United
States v. Rosenblum (1920, W. D. Pa.) 264 Fed. 578; United States v.
Oglesby Grocery Co. (1920, N. D. Ga.) 264 Fed. 691. See NOTES (1920) 69
U. PA. L. REv. 56.
25 Peik v. Chicago & N, W. Ry., supra note 9.
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graph companies, '" and gas,- water-" and lighting companies.-:
The movement, however, received several checks. The state's
power to fix rates for furnishing surety bonds and indemnity
contracts was denied in a case decided before the Gcrma;a Alliance
Insurawe Co. case.-" Efforts at limiting the commissions charge-
able by employment agencies have been held invalid in several
cases,3' while an attempt to deny them the right to charge any
commissions whatever met a like fate in the Federal Supreme
Court.32 The state cannot limit the profits of retail dealers of
school text books, although it can do so in the case of retail
dealers selected by public school authorities to act as their agents
in the sale of text books purchased by such authorities. -, An
effort to empower a state commission to fix the prices of all com-
modities has been held unconstitutional." It is, however, in the
field of fixing the prices of labor and other forms of personal
service that the most definite and serious check has been received.
This power has been denied even in the case of the wages to be
paid by public contractors.23 Nor can public authorities fix the
compensation to be paid by the owners of a theatre to a fire
guard required to be maintained there.-' Congress has no power
to prescribe minimum wages for women ;- but the existence ot
an emergency in the form of a threatened general railroad strike
confers upon it the power to fix the wages of railroad employee-
engaged in interstate commerce for at least a limited period.'
Whatever doubts may have existed after the Adldns case as to
203 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Myatt (1899, C. C. Kan.) 93 Fed. 335.
-7 Cleveland Gaslight & Coke Co. v. Cleveland (1891, C. C. N. D. Ohio)
71 Fed. 610.
28 Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler (1884) 110 U. S. 347, 4 Sup.
Ct. 48.
-9 Southcrz Oklahoma Power Co. v. Corporation Conai'rioa, szpr'a note
13.
30 American Silrety Co. v. Shallenbergcr (1910, C. C. Neb.) 183 Fed. 66
3'Ex parte Dickey (1904) 144 Calif. 234, 77 Pae. 924; Wl'ilGonz v. City
and County of Denver (1919) 65 Colo. 484, 178 Pac. 17; COMMXE:T ON CA, s
(1923) 12 CALIF. L. Rnv. 511.
32 Adams v. Tanner (1917) 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662.
3 MMifllan Co. v. Johnson (1920, E. D. Mich.) 269 Fed. 2S.
3- A. 11. Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyle (1920, D. C. Mont.) 203 Fed. 131.
See NOTES (1920) 33 HAnv. L. REV. 838.
3Street v. Varney Electrical Supply Co. (1903) 160 Ind. 33S, 66 X. E.
895; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Colcr (1901) 166 N. Y. 1, 59 X. E. 716;
contra: Malette v. Spokane (1913) 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496.
- O'Neil -o. Provid nce Amutsemwc-t Co. (1920) 42 R. 1. 479, 103 MtI. 8S7.
'7Adkins v. Childrei's Hospital (1923) 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394.
38 Wilson. v. New (1917) 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298. See Powell,
Due Process and the Adamson Law (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 114; Powell, Tho
Supremne Court aad the Adamson Law (1917) 65 U. PA. L. REv. 607. The
former article was written prior to the decision.
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the constitutionality of state minimum wage laws for women9
have been resolved by the recent holding which invalidates
them.40 Nor can a state regulate wages generally if that regu-
lation is an integral part of a general plan of compulsory arbi-
tration of industrial disputes.4' The Supreme Court in the Ad-
kins case expressly declined to consider the validity of Congres-
sional minimum wage legislation as applied to minors ;42 and at
least one state court, influenced thereby, has sustained a state
minimum wage law in such case.43 Much of the reasoning in
the Adkins case would condemn such laws even as applied to
minors. 4  There is, however, one field of personal services in
which price fixing has been generally recognized as valid, namely,
that of attorney's services of certain kinds. The power of Con-
gress to limit attorney's fees for prosecuting claims against the
United States to a stated percentage of the amount recovered
has been sustained on various theories that will be hereinafter
more fully considered.45 State statutes have similarly been up-
held that limited such fees for services rendered in presenting
claims arising under workmen's compensation acts to sums fixed
by the boards charged with the administration of such statutes.4"
Most of the instances discussed in the two preceding para-
graphs involved the fixing of specific prices either by the legis-
lature or a commission; some dealt with legislative definitions of
a price standard the exact meaning of which in particular cases
was a matter for judicial determination, in somewhat the same
manner as the duty of common carriers to carry for a "reason-
able" rate at the common law. The common element in all of
them was the complete absence of the regulated person's will and
initiative as a factor in fixing the price or standard. This rep-
39 See Stetler v. O'Hara (1917) 243 U. S. 629, 37 Sup. Ct. 475. For
collection of authorities prior to decision in the Adkins case see Powell,
Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HAav. L. Rsv. 545,
footnotes 3 to 7, inclusive.
40 John W. Murphy v. A. Sardell (Oct. 19, 1925) U. S. Sup. Ct., Oct. Term,
1925, No. 18 (Memorandum).
41 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations (1923) 262 U. S.
522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630; COr MENTS (1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 196; NOTE
AND COMMENT (1923) 22 MICH. L. REv. 135. For a discussion of the history
and functioning of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, see Rabinowitz,
The Kansas Industrial Court Act (1923) 12 CALiF. L. REv. 1.
42 Adkins 'v. .hildren's Hospital, supra note 37, at 554, 43 Sup. Ct. at 400.
4 3 Stevenson v. St. Clair (1925, Minn.) 201 N. W. 629.
44 This is particularly true in so far as the opinion in the Adkins case
stresses the moral requirement that wages must bear some relation to the
value of the service.
45 Frisbie v'. United States (1895) 157 U. S. 160, 15 Sup. Ct. 586; Ball v.
Halsell (1896) 161 U. S. 72, 16 Sup. Ct. 554; Calhoun v. Massie (1920) 253
U. S. 170, 40 Sup. Ct. 474. See NOTES (1916) 29 HARV. L. REV. 328.
46Dysart vz. Yeiser (1923) 110 Neb. 65, 192 N. W. 953; Grit 's Case
(1922) 241 Mass. 525, 135 N. E. 874.
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resents the extreme of price control. There is a milder form
that has been quite extensively employed, in which the standard
for prices in one locality is stated in terms of prices for the
same commodity voluntarily maintained by the seller or pur-
chaser in another locality. Statutes of this kind have invariably
aimed at practices frequently resorted to by those bent on mon-
opoly. It is this fact which obscured their essential char-
acter as a type of governmental price control. The imposition
of such limitation upon the seller's freedom of action has been
upheld in the case of sellers of petroleum and its products 47 and
of commodities in general.-" The validity of similar restrictions
upon purchasers of farm products in agricultural states has been
sustained in several states. 9
The most cursory examination of the decisions sustaining and
denying the validity of government price control shows the futil-
ity of attempting to discover the underlying principles apart
from an analysis of the reasoning of the courts. The cases may
for this purpose be conveniently divided into the following
groups: (1) those involving price control of the product of a
business or industry, whether a commodity or a service, in which
the producer's will constitutes no factor in determining the
price or price standard; (2) those involving a similar fixing of
wages or other form of compensation for personal services; and
(3) those involving the establishment of a price standard iii terms
of other prices voluntarily maintained by those subject to the
regulation. The first of these is easily the most important
group; the last the least significant. They will be considered
in the order of their statement.
The case of M11unni v. Iluizoisi was the first important instance
in which the Federal Supreme Court formulated the constitu-
tional problems raised by government price control. Our pres-
ent concern is solely with its validity under the "due process"
clause. The "commerce" and "contract" clauses of the Federal
Constitution have sometimes been invoked against price controlsi
but the "due process" clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments have been the principal reliance of those who have opposed
it. The reasoning of the Momvnn case is, in brief, that the power
to regulate prices had in the past been exercised by the govern-
ment of the nation from which our legal conceptions were de-
47Stat e ex rel. Yomng io. Standard Oil Co. (1910) 111 Minn. 85, 12G
N. W. 527. See also Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota (1912) 226 U. S.
157, 33 Sup. Ct. 66.
48 State v. Drayton (1908) 32 Neb. 254, 117 N. W. 763.
49 State v. Brdgeman & Rzissell Co. (1912) 117 Iinn. 186, 134 N. W.
496; State . Fairmont Creamery Co. (1912) 153 Iowa, 702, 133 N. W. 395.
5o Supra note 8.
51 Ibid. (commerce clause); Brown Holdhzg Co. v. Feldwuanz, anpra note 1S
(contract clause).
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rived; that that government was subject to the same kind of
limitations as were imposed upon our state and federal govern-
ments by the "due process" clauses; that the legal principles justi-
fying such regulation were discoverable in the common law be-
cause the rights protected by those constitutional provisions
came from it; that the significant principle was that when prop-
erty becomes affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris
privati only, and may have the price of its uses regulated; and
that the fact of a virtual monopoly, which was an assumed fact
in the case, -was in the case of some businesses a sufficient com-
mon law basis on which to predicate that requisite characteristic.
This whole argument is vitiated by the tacit assumption that the
common law furnishes the measure of what our legislatures can
do under our constitutions. The approach is rather that of a
court extending the field of price control apart from legislation
than of a court defining the constitutional limits of a legislative
expansion of the field. This was probably due to the fact that
the two problems had not yet been adequately differentiated.
The dissenting opinion is based on the same assumptiofi and
manifests the same confusion of problems.2 It is, of course, im-
possible to determine how the persistence of this erroneous ap-
proach might have affected the course of judicial decisions on
the legislative power of price control. The common law is a vast
reservoir in which it would have been possible to discover, if
necessary, general principles of the most sweeping character
to justify price fixing in a wide field. It would, however, have
considerably affected the technique for establishing the validity
of such efforts by overemphasizing the importance of historical
factors at the expense of a rational consideration of present
needs. It is, therefore, a considerable gain that the courts have
long since adopted a different conception of the problem. There
has been no material change in the form in which the question is
stated. It has always been correctly conceived as defining the
limits set to the police or some other governmental power by
various constitutional prohibitions of which the "due process"
clauses are the most important. There has, however, been a
considerable change in the factors relied upon as determinants
of the answer. The earlier cases abound with references to his-
torical instances of price control ;r3 the analogies relied upon in
the later cases are decisions involving other exercises of the
police power,5 4 and this is as true of the dissenting as of the pre-
vailing opinions.55
52 Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, supra note S.
53 Munn v. Illinois, supra note 8. For a late case in which the historical
argument was used against the present existence of the power to fix prices
see A. M. Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyle, supra note 34.
54 Block v. Hirsh, supra note 18.
55 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, supra note 11.
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The Muiut case made liability to price control depend on the
fact that the property used in the business was affected with a
public interest. The erroneous implication that it was limited
to cases in which the regulated subject was the use of property:'
has long since been eliminated. There has been substituted the
conception of business affected with a public interest.W The
problem today is conceived as that of delimiting the field of busi-
ness activity constitutionally subject to price control; and it is
realized that the determining factors are independent of whether
the business consists in supplying the public with commodities,
the uses of property, or services in whose rendering the use of
property is practically unimportant. The principal issue has
been to determine the kind or degree of public interest that must
exist in order that the business may be said to be thus affected
with a public interest. The courts have grappled with this
problem through an extended series of cases; but thus far their
efforts ,not only to evolve a logical definition but even to give
the conception definite and concrete content have proved futile.
This will be apparent from the following comparatively recent
statement:
"The circumstances which clothe a particular kind of business
with a public interest, in the sense of Munn v. Illinois and the
other cases, must be such as to create a peculiarly close relation
between the public and those engaged in it, and raise implications
of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reasonable in
dealing with the public." *3
That the courts themselves have recognized this appears clearly
from the following language in the opinion last cited:
"It is very difficult under the cases to lay down a working rule
by which readily to determine when a business has become
'clothed with a public interest.' All business is subject to some
kinds of public regulation, but when the public becomes so pe-
culiarly dependent upon a particular business that one engaging
therein subjects himself to a more intimate public regulation is
only to be determined by the process of exclusion and inclusion
and to gradual establishment of a line of distinction." -
The difficulties that have thus far prevented courts from achiev-
ing a satisfactory definition and description of the conception
are so inherent in the problem that future efforts in that direc-
tion are little likely to prove more successful. The only avail-
G See dissenting opinion in German Alliance Isurance Co. -e. Lelui3, scpra
note 11, at 425 et seq., 34 Sup. Ct. at 624, for statement of this view.
57 See majority opinion in case last cited, at 403 ot scq., 34 Sup. Ct. at
617 et seq.
c Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of INdustrial Relations, supra note 41 at
536, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.
9 Ibid., at 538, 539, 43 Sup. Ct. at 634.
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able method is an inductive study to discover the facts on which
the courts have predicated the requisite public interest.
The legislative fiat that the requisite public interest exists is
not in itself a sufficient fact to establish such interest.- Other
facts must exist to give that judgment the character of reason-
ableness. The prevailing opinion in the Munn case found such
fact not, as is usually stated,01 in the mere existence of a virtual
monopoly, but in the existence of such monopoly in a business in
which as a result thereof the producers were in a position to
impose upon the public what the court calls a "common charge." 02
The New York court in passing upon a statute very similar to
that involved in the Munn case based the existence of the requisite
public interest not upon a single fact, but upon a series of 'facts
which included the nature and extent of the business, its impor-
tance as an element in the trade and commerce of the state and
nation, the relation of the business to the prosperity and welfare
of the state, the fact that the business was rendered possible only
by the existence of a canal built and maintained at public expense,
and the existence of a virtual monopoly. 3 The decision was
affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court in an opinion expressly
approving as sound the views of the New York court abov6 set
forth.0 4 The public interest that justified regulating the price of
fire insurance was based as much upon its practical necessity to
business activity and enterprise and the disparity in bargaining
power between the insured and insurer as upon virtual monopoly.0'
The Rent Cases afford further proof that the requisite interest
usually arises from a group of facts rather than from a single
fact. Those specifically mentioned are the existence of a public
exigency, the embarrassment to the government and danger to the
public health of the existing conditions, the character of housing
as a necessity of life, and the necessary monopolistic character
of the business.06 The existence of a practical monopoly in a
necessary of life was held to justify fixing the price of ice.07 It is
not even essential that the regulated article come within the class
of necessaries. It has been held sufficient that it is one, such as
theatre tickets, which the public desires or commonly uses, if
circumstances, such as monopolistic control, result in extortionate
prices therefor.,8  The historical fact that, places of amusement
had always been considered and treated in the state as affected
60 Ibid., at 536, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.
61 Wyman, op. cit. supra note 7.
62 Munn v. Illinois, supra note 8, at 132.
63People v. Budd (1889) 117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. 670.
" Budd v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468.
05 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, supra note 11.
60 Block v. Hirsh, supra note 18, at 156, 41 Sup. Ct. at 459.
67 Oklahoma Lt. & Power Co. v. Corporation Commission, supra note 14.
68 People v. Weller, supra note 16.
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with a public interest and devoted to a public use (by which
apparently no more was meant than that they had always been
subjected to a high degree of regulation in other respects) was
one factor relied upon by the Massachusetts court in an advisory
opinion sustaining the power to limit the price for the services
of a ticket scalper.0 9 The grant of special privileges is a fact on
which it can be predicated.70 It can exist even if the business
is not one in which there is the duty to serve all making reasonable
request therefor, or upon which such duty could be imposed by
legislation.71 The business need not be one to which the public
must resort; it is sufficient if in the light of business habits cur-
rent at the time the public would most probably desire to avail
itself of the commodity or service furnished by the business in
question.72
There have been not a few cases that have sustained price fix-
ing for commodities and services, other than personal services,
without expressly and formally invoking the principle that the
business involved was affected with a public interest in its narrow
and technical sense. The state's power to fix coal prices was
sustained on the theory that, if price regulation is a valid method
for preventing oppression and extortion in the field of technical
public services, it is a valid remedy to prevent the like results in
the field of private business.- The federal power to regulate coal
prices during the war was upheld as a necessary war measure,
and to prevent the strong from extorting unreasonable profits
through the exigencies of war .7  Although the power of Congress
to regulate the prices of necessaries was in one case based on the
fact that the public had an interest in them," other cases upheld
it as a necessary war measure without relying upon that princi-
ple.70  The New York court in the ticket scalping case 7 e:,pressed
some doubt as to whether that were a business affected with a
public interest and, therefore, urged as an independent argument
in favor of its validity the power of the legislature to prevent ex-
tortion by adopting the remedy most likely to effect that result.
The reasoning of all these decisions, in the final analysis, is in
substance that the legislatures have the power to promote the
69 In. re Opinion of the Jz:tfces, supra note 16.
- TO Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of INdustrial Relations, oupra note 41, at
535, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.
7' German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lcwi,, supra note 11, at 407, 34 Sup.
Ct. at 616.
72-Ibid. at 417, 34 Sup. Ct. at 620.
-American Coal Minizg Co. v. Special Coal and Food Comm. of Ind.,
supra note 17.
74 United States v. Pennsylvania Central Coal Co., supra note 21.
75 United States v. Rose;zbluom, supra note 24.
7G See other cases cited in note 24.
77 People V. Weler, supra, note 16.
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general welfare by preventing through price control the undue
capitalization by any group of its economic powers. Their signifi-
cance does not consist in their having developed a more definite
and easily applied test of liability to price control. They have
been no more successful in that respect than the line of cases
formulating the determining factors in terms of business affected
with a public interest. Their chief importance lies in their broader
approach to the problem of price control. It is their special merit
that they have, in the very form of its statement, recognized
the problem of price control as a species of well-known and more
inclusive genus.
The cases dealing with the power to fix the price of labor and
other forms of personal service are significant primarily because
the conception, "affected with a public interest", has been a
practically negligible factor in the decisions. It was referred
to in but two of the principal cases, and then only incidentally."8
The problem has generally been treated as a particular instance
of determining the limits imposed on legislative action by the
"due process" standard, with no attempt to give it a definitely
distinct complexion through a secondary formula. The various
minimum wage decisions constitute the most important cases of
this type. The Supreme Court has held every such law uncon-
stitutional except that involved in Wilson v. New."' Its decisions,
therefore, serve rather to define the field through indicating factors
of exclusion than of inclusion. The case last cited is the only
one that gives any indication of the factors on which wage fixing
can be predicated. That decision is rested on more than a single
reason; but the ultimate premise on which they are all based is
the power of the government to prevent existing or threatened
public injury by adopting a remedy reasonably adapted to achieve
that result. The logical extension of this principle would justify
even compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes, and the case
contains an intimation to that effect. The Court has, however,
refused so to extend it in a case involving a dispute in a relatively
small packing plant.80 The significance of this difference in views
on the matter is that the extent of the public injury is an impor-
tant factor in appraising the validity of wage fixing, and that this
is closely related to the importance of the industry to the com-
munity's general economic welfare. The emphasis in Wilson ).
New upon the fact that railroading was a public service, and its
later reference in the Wolff Packing Company case to the absence
of that element, suggest the inference that public service indus-
tries possess that degree of economic importance that will justify
78 Wilson v. New, supra note 38; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus-
trial Relations, supra note 41.
,9 Supra note 38.
80 Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, supra note 41.
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wage fixing therein. It is, however, only a suggestion, for the
language in the case last referred to, that the fact that a business
is a public service does not justify every form of regulation, trans-
forms an apparently definite test of inclusion into one of extreme
vagueness. That quality is even truer of the tests of exclusion
developed in the Adkins case with its emphasis on the fact that
the wage standard was based on the necessities of one of the
parties without taking account of the moral requirement that
wages should bear some reasonable relation to the value of the
services performed, and its stress on the theory of freedom of
contract. These describe only a vague ideal, and state only con-
clusions based on unexpressed premises.sI Their value as factors
defining the field to which wage fixing cannot validly extend is
quite negligible. The Court has practically left the problem of
defining the constitutional field of wage fixing in that state of
convenient vagueness which characterizes most problems of "due
process" as a limit on legislative action. One might well hesitate
to predict on the basis of the decisions and their reasoning the
fate of minimum wages for minors, or even for adult men and
women in certain industrial fields. There is no logical or practi-
cal reason for limiting wage fixing to public service industries, for
evils may arise in other fields for which it would be a reasonable
remedy. It must, however, be frankly admitted that the decisions
and reasoning afford little ground for optimism to those who
would use it to create what they believe to be a desirable social
order.
The reasoning of the cases sustaining the fixing of attorney's
fees afford the clearest proof that price fixing is not dependent
on the existence of the facts denoted by the technical conception
"affected with a public interest." The power of Congress to limit
such fees has been upheld by invoking its power to determine
the circumstances under which applications for pensions could
be prosecuted, 2 and to impose conditions in consenting to suits
against the United States.' These narrow technical bases are
scarcely noticed in a later case which rests the power primarily
upon the purpose and tendency of such legislation to prevent
extortion and improvident bargains and the stirring up of un-
just claims.5 - It is this danger of oppression which state courts
have stressed in sustaining the fixing of attorney's fees in cases
arising under their workmen's compensation acts.s The Nebraska
81 See for discussion of this opinion Powell, op. cit. supra note 383;
COMAMNTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 829; NOn AND COMMNT (1923)
21 MICH. L. REv. 906; COMMENT ON CASES (1923) 11 CA,%L. L. REV. 353;
NoTEs (1924) 58 Am. L. Rnv. 581.
2 Frisbie v. United States, supra note 45.
83 BaU v. Halsefl, supra, note 45.
8 4 Calhoun v. Massie, supra note 45.
Is. Gritta's Case, supra note 46.
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court further emphasized the public interest in preventing the
depletion of an award by improvident and unreasonable contracts
for legal services, and the reasonable relation of the fee-fixing
provisions to the general policy of such acts.sa The case was
affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court in an opinion the language
of which amounts to an approval of the state courts' reasoning,
although the technical factor of the attorney's position is seconda-
rily relied upon. 7 The most significant fact that emerges from
the analysis of this line of cases is the shift in the basis upon
which legislation of this character has been sustained. The
earlier decisions rested their validity on rather narrow and highly
technical grounds; the later cases, while not entirely excluding
them, rely almost wholly upon factors that take account of the
realities of the problem which such legislation is intended to meet.
They show clearly that price fixing is valid when the system of
prices determined by individual bargaining exposes even a limited
social group to the dangers of oppression and extortion, and that
this is even truer where that system produces consequences in-
jurious to the social group as a whole. It is the existence of these
facts that constitutes the decisive factor. Nothing in their
reasoning suggests limiting the principle to cases in which those
facts are due to particular causes such as virtual monopoly.
Nothing in these decisions expressly restricts their scope to
services reasonably necessary in the light of current standards of
living; but the services actually involved can fairly be so
described. It is reasonably certain that the principles will not
be applied to the services of a valet. The technical argument
based on the attorney's special position affords no basis for limit-
ing the doctrine to attorney's fees; and the same is true of the
other technical bases as restrictive factors. The ultimate scope
of the principle will have to be deduced from the broad general
reasoning urged in its support.
The establishment of a price standard in terms of other prices
voluntarily maintained by those subject to the regulation has not
usually been considered in discussing the field of price control.
It represents, however, a true case thereof, in that it compels the
seller or buyer, in fixing prices in a particular market, to take
account of a factor which he would usually wish to disregard,
especially in the cases at which such legislation is aimed. The
decisions sustaining it have invariably done so because it con-
stituted a reasonable method for preserving the freedom of mar-
kets by forbidding practices frequently employed to eliminate
competition. 8 The reasoning follows the conventional lines for
establishing the validity of an exercise of the police power. The
86 Dysart v. Yeiser, supra note 46.
87 Yeiser v. Dysart (1925, U. S.) 45 Sup. Ct. 399.
88 See cases cited in notes 47, 48, and 49.
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preservation of competition is assumed to be a socially desirable
end; the establishment of such price standards a reasonable means
for its promotion. The conception, "affected with a public inter-
est", constituted no factor in it.
The discussion thus far has been devoted to a survey of the
decisions and the specification of the important factors that have
contributed to shaping the law, in so far as they are stated in the
opinions. It is a fair question whether they admit of any practi-
cally useful generalization which will summarize not only the
situations in which price control is valid, but also those in which
it is invalid. Most of the attempted generalizations have been
made with sole reference to businesses affected with a public in-
terest. The frequent emphasis on the fact of virtual monopoly
has led one writer to make that the sole factor in defining what
businesses were affected with a public interest in so far as that
was independent of the grant of special privileges or franchises. -3
It was advanced as the sole determinant of the validity of price
control in that field not only in the sense that its existence justified
that type of regulation, but that its absence interposed a bar to
its constitutionality. The broadest possible conclusion warranted
by the cases was that virtual monopoly justified price control; to
draw the further inference that there were no other circumstances
justifying it involved a patent non-seq.iti r, and ignored Brass r.
Nort& Dakota." The theory also overlooked the reference to other
factors in most of the cases. The character of the commodity or
service as a necessary is stressed almost as much and as often as
the element of virtual monopoly. There are no rules for certainly
determining the decisive factor on which a legal conclusion de-
pends when the cases from which it is derived more frequently
than not refer to a group of factors. There is always the logical
alternative of construing the cases to require the concurrence of
the several factors stated in them. The generalization in terms
of virtual monopoly is, therefore, inadequate, even as applied to
the limited field of businesses affected with a public interest, for,
apart from Brass v. North Dakota, it ignores the emphasis on the
character of the commodity or service as a factor in the decisions.
It is even more incorrect as applied to the whole field of price
control. It is not relied on in either the cases involving price
fixing during the war9 or those involving fixing the fees of attor-
neys in various situations. -
An early attempt was made to limit the field of price control to
businesses having some special relation to the possibility of op-
s9 Wyman, op. cit., supra note 7; also Wyman, Statc Control of Public
Utilities (1911) 24 HARV. L. REV. 624.
9D (1894) 153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857.
91 United States v. Pennsylvania C nt. Coal Co., supra note 21; ee alio
cases cited in note 24.
92 See cases cited in notes 45, 46, and 87.
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pression.9 3 The expression, "special relation to the possibility of
oppression", probably means only that that possibility must exist.
The indefiniteness of the test is somewhat removed by specifying
those facts which would usually establish that possibility. These
include de jure or de facto monopoly or the grant of special privi-
leges; the fact that the commodity is a necessary of life or an
essential to the community's industrial welfare; or that it is one
that has been immemorially subject to regulation. Their state-
ment in the alternative is clearly incorrect. The theory would
justify fixing the price of necessaries solely because they were
such; but the decisions scarcely warrant so broad a proposition.
Its inadequacy, in so far as it invokes virtual monopoly, requires
no further consideration. This general test has recently been re-
vived with some modification of the specific factors on which its
applicability is made to depend . 4 The factors suggested as essen-
tial are that the industry must involve a necessity of life or at
least a product of great importance to the welfare of the com-
munity, and the inadequacy of competition to protect the con-
sumer. Their statement in the conjunctive represents a more ac-
curate generalization than the earlier attempt. Neither, however,
accords with the decisions sustaining price fixing for commodities
or services which the public commonly uses"5 unless that be given
the rather forced construction of an equivalent for necessaries or
products of great importance to the welfare of the community.
It is the merit of these generalizations to have directed attention
to the importance of oppression, or its possibility, as factors vali-
dating price control. The second element in the more recent of
them will be considered in the discussion immediately following.
There has recently appeared a tendency to substitute for the
conception of virtual monopoly that of the inadequacy of com-
petition to protect the public." This theory makes such inade-
quacy the sole basis for including a business within the field sub-
ject to price control, and the adequacy of competition the decisive
factor of exclusion from that field. The significance of this shift
depends on the meaning of this later form of statement. It must
clearly be taken to denote some condition other than the total
absence of competition, since otherwise it would be merely another
way of describing the fact of virtual monopoly in its most extreme
form. The legal conception of virtual monopoly has included not
only cases of complete monopoly but also those in which existing
competition has been an ineffective check upon the economic
93 Freund, op. cit., supra note 1, at 389.
94 NoTE AND COMMENT (1920) 19 MIica. L. Rnv. 74.
9 People v. Weller, supra, note 16; In re Opinion of the Justices, supra
note 16.
96 Simpson, Due Process and Coal Price Regulation (1924) 9 IOWA L.
BULL. 145. See for an early intimation in that direction Lewis, Can Prices
be Regulated by Law? (1893) 32 Am. L. REG. 9.
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powers of one or a limited number of the producing units. There
would, therefore, be no particular value in supplanting virtual
monopoly with the inadequacy of competition if the latter meant
no more than the absence of a sufficient degree of competition to
make it effective. There are, however, situations in which,
although there exists bona fide competition among those who sup-
ply the commodity or service, that group as a whole has an advan-
tage over the consuming group as a whole. This usually means
no more than that the intensity of the competition among con-
sumers for an article, of which there is but a limited quantity
available as compared with the total demand therefor at all prices,
permits the owners of the supply to realize a price deemed un-
fair by reference to some assumed standard of a fair price. The
rent cases involved situations of that type. Although the court
described them as monopolies,"- it is clear that they were monopo-
lies of a different character than that involved in the Mzami case,
in which the elevator owners had fixed a uniform price scale by
agreement. It is unfortunate to use the same term to describe
both the situation in which there is no competition or practically
none, and that in which the keenest competition may exist but be
ineffective because of intense competition among consumers to pro-
tect them from extortion. The latter is more correctly described
as one in which existing competition is inadequate to afford the
public that protection against extortionate prices which com-
petition is assumed to give. The conception is broad enough to
include not only every case of virtual monopoly, but also those in
which the failure of the protective function of competition is due
to other conditions affecting supply, and to conditions of demand.
It is, therefore, something more than a mere substitute for virtual
monopoly; it states a more inclusive theory that in a sense includes
the factor of the character of the commodity or service being regu-
lated. This wider implication has not always, if ever, been clearly
grasped.9s It is, however, a more adequate formulation even
of those factors of supply relied on in adjudging the validity of
price control than is that in terms of virtual monopoly. It is
in its wider sense above indicated the nearest approach to an
adequate generalization of the field of price control. It suffers
from the defect common to all the generalizations thus far con-
sidered in that it takes no account of those instances in which
price control is used as a method for preserving competition
rather than as a means for protecting the public against the
results of its inadequacy. The cases requiring the maintenance
of a fixed relation between prices of the same commodity in differ-
ent markets are of that type. It seems to have been tacitly as-
97 Blod v. Hirsh, supra note 13.
98 See supra note 94.
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sumed that these cases can be ignored in discussing the problem
of price control.
The adequacy of these various attempted generalizations was
tested primarily with reference to the reasoning of the cases.
The conclusions will require no modification if that is supple-
mented by their facts. There was no virtual monopoly in either
Brass v. North Dakota, the cases of price fixing during the war,
those involving the fixing of attorney's fees, or those dealing with
the establishment of a price standard in terms of prices voluntarily
maintained in other markets. There is no proof that the threat
to the public's interest as consumers was in every case due to the
failure of the protective function of competition, unless it be as-
sumed that society relies upon competition to prevent all socially
undesirable results so that their very existence establishes its in-
adequacy. What the courts had in mind in the fee fixing cases
was the inequality in the bargaining powers of the attorneys and
their clients of a particular class; and the presence of that same
fact furnished the basis for a part of the argument in the insur-
ance cases. That is not a fact which competition (a word in its
correct sense meaning only the rivalry among those on the same
side of the market) could be expected to prevent or even remedy.
It is rather a factor validly to be considered in deciding the extent
to which society should rely upon competition. The ticket scalp-
ing cases show that price control has invaded a field not concerned
with necessaries of life or products of great importance to the
social welfare.
No theory as to the field within which price control is con-
stitutional can ignore any of its forms. What is needed is a theory
that shall comprehend them all, a broader principle than can be
derived by considering only a limited section of the whole field.
This is required in order to prevent the problem 6f price control
from being solved in terms of technical considerations that will in-
evitably restrict its scope more than is demanded by the rather
vague "due process" standard that constitutes the principal barrier
to this form of social experimentation. The problem is to define
that principle in terms which will not be so vague as to be practi-
cally useless and yet which will not sacrifice completeness to the
desire for definiteness. Such a theory must first of all summarize
the decisions to date, but should also, if possible, serve as the
basis for predicting what particular instances, the legal status of
which had not yet been determined, would probably be held to be
within that field. It should function as any other scientific
generalization except that the character of the data on which it
is based will almost certainly reduce the probability of successful
prediction. The ideal would be a principle that made the validity
or invalidity of price fixing a corrollary of the existence or non-
existence of facts themselves capable of objective determination,
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whether immediate or through inferences that involved only judg-
ments of what is as distinguished from judgments implying valua-
tions. The principles thus far applied to the problem that most
nearly approximate this standard are those stated in terms of
monopoly, legal or virtual, of the grant of special privileges of
franchises, and of the common use of the commodity by the public,
rather than its necessary or indispensable nature. The require-
ment that the commodity be a necessary of life or a product of
great importance to the community's welfare describes facts the
existence of which can be determined only by first postulating
some theory of ends. The statement that competition has not
adequately protected the public is meaningless without some
theory as to the kind of society that is wanted, by reference to
which the quality of the results can be tested. A judgment that
certain prices are oppressive or extortionate implies the existence
of some standard of fair or just prices. All these tests, including
those that appear to denote merely objective facts, postulate
norms. The difference between the two types is not that the one
has no reference to norms, but rather that it considers the particu-
lar norms that are assumed as beyond dispute. To limit the field
of price control to cases in which there exists virtual monopoly
is to assume that the "due process" clauses are a definite commit-
ment to the theory that government cannot attempt to modify
the economic results of competition. To define that field so as
to include all cases in which the public is not adequately protected
by competition, whether because of its partial or complete absence,
the level of competitive standards, or any other reason, opens up
the whole question of what kind of society is desired. It is
possible thereunder to question the validity of the assumption
accepted as final by the virtual monopoly theory. The results and
reasoning of the cases cannot, therefore, be made to fit any theory
that correlates price control with one or a group of facts which
do not involve an evaluation process. They are compatible only
with one that includes an assumed social ideal. °0
It is a grave defect of such theories as that of virtual monopoly
that they conceal the fact of such an assumption. This is not
true of such a theory as that of the inadequacy of competition to
protect the public. The latter theory, however, is too narrow in
limiting price control to the correction of those evils which result
from the imperfections of competition as a regulative force. There
are evils incident to economic activity that cannot be ascribed to
that cause unless that conception be taken to mean no more than
sq The social ideal is described as assumed for the reason that, in the
writer's opinion, there are not yet existent sufficient data to prove the
necessary validity of any such ideal. The efforts of philosophy to establish
such ideals have been valuable almost entirely as examinations of such
assumptions.
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that a competitive regime is not a guarantee against the exist-
ence of all socially undesirable results. That is in substance
equivalent to saying that the existence of those evils is the signifi-
cant factor determining the validity of price control; and that
might as well be stated directly. The results and reasoning of
the decisions are compatible only with that view. Fee fixing is
justified to prevent oppression and extortion irrespective of the
causes producing them. Limiting sellers to prices defined by
reference to those voluntarily maintained by them in other mar-
kets is sustained without any reference to the inadequacy of com-
petition to protect the public, but rather to maintain competition
which is assumed to be an adequate protective mechanism. It is
the existence of evils that constitutes the real basis for permitting
price control, not the fact that these result from particular
causes. 100 They will usually be due to causes operating in our
economic price system; but there are many reasons why that might;
produce socially undesirable results. It functions in a social order
in which economic power is very unequally distributed. The
result may be that the community's economic powers are directed
into channels deemed injurious, or at least less important than
alternative channels. The federal government dealt with this
problem during the war through an extensive system of rationing
and priorities. The regulative function of price in our economic
system suggests the possibility of employing price control for the
same ends, even though it might be practically useless unless
supplemented by some such system of control as existed during
the war. The important thing, however, is that price control
should not be limited to the correction of only those evils arising
ouf of or in connection with the price system which competition
has failed to prevent. The decisive factor should be, and is, not
that competition has failed to protect the public but that price
control is a reasonable method for dealing with those evils. No
narrower generalization adequately takes account of the results
and reasoning of the cases defining the field of price control in all,
as distinct from some only, of its forms.
The suggested theory, like that of the inadequacy of competition
as a protective device, implies a standard for determining what
constitute evils or socially undesirable results. The constitutional
problem is such that this is inevitable, and it might as well be
expressly recognized as tacitly assumed. A theory of price
control that tests its validity by reference to a social ideal runs
the risk of being so vague as to be practically worthless. The
conception of a social ideal is too complex to be simply stated.
The practical impossibility of giving full scope to the almost in-
finite individual claims of the members of a social group necessi-
100 This method of approach is adopted in Anercan Coal Mining Co. v.
Special Coal and Food -Comm. of Ind., supra note 17.
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tates selection. The construction of a social ideal involves an
evaluation of these frequently competing claims. Attempts to
arrange them in a scale of relative significances by reference to
some single principle of evaluation have invariably proved futile.
The formula of utilitarianism is neither better nor worse in this
respect than those of the metaphysical jurists. The courts have
wisely refrained from any such ambitious attempts. Their fre-
quent emphasis on individualism has seldom, if ever, gone to that
extent. They have followed the practice, not restricted to them,
of constructing it piecemeal. It would be almost impossible to
discover an inclusive standard invariably applied in passing on
the validity of legislation; but it is possible within limits to trace
the outlines of the standard applied in connection with particular
problems. The social ideal postulated in dealing with price con-
trol has been one in which individual freedom in economic matters
has in general been assigned a greater significance than equalizing
economic opportunities or insuring that the basic wants of one
individual should be provided for before lesser wants of another
should be satisfied. It has assumed that competition is usually
a more efficient regulative method than governmental interference
to insure the socially desirable production and distribution, or at
least that the limitation of freedom incident to the latter system
generally more than counterbalances the gains therefrom in other
respects. The theory of a just price may have disappeared from
economic theory; but it has persisted in law to mitigate somewhat
the logical results of incorporating in the social ideal the elements
just discussed. The standard of the just price has usually, but
not always, been one determined under free competition among
the producers. These are the important elements of the standard
used to test the validity of price control. The truth of the assump-
tions implicit in their selection has never been either proved or dis-
Droved; and it is doubtful whether it ever can be. The injection
of ethical notions of fair price considerably enhances the proba-
bility of error in making predictions on the basis of that standard.
This is increased by the fact that the courts have recognized that
a dynamic conception of the ideal is not inconsistent with the
constitution. The field of price control, therefore, cannot be said
to have been accurately defined if the standard is limited to that
thus far developed. The next decision may introduce a new
element or change the relative emphasis on the old. This un-
certainty can be reduced, but not entirely eliminated, by consider-
ing the nature of the court's function in dealing with this problem.
The selection of values and the determination of their relative
order is a problem in social policy. It would normally be for
the legislature to perform those functions in so far as the state
might undertake to make a particular selection or order effective
through law. The courts have frequently exercised them even
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in cases not involving constitutional issues. The conception of
public policy has proved a most efficient tool in this connection.1 '
It is, however, in the field of constitutional law that the courts
have done so most frequently, and particularly in developing the
meaning of "due process" as a limit on the substance of legislation.
The "due process" clauses circumscribe the field within which the
legislature cah exercise its policy-determining powers. They are
themselves expressions of a policy, and designate, vaguely though
it be, certain values deemed of such importance that the legislature
has been inhibited from selecting others at their expense. It is
idle to speculate whether that theory accords with the intention of
their framers; it represents the law today. The courts' problem
is to determine what those values are, and when the legislative
selection of competing values sacrifices them unduly. The term
"due process" itself suggests no specific content, and this makes
it inevitable that the courts deal in problems of policy in giving
it that content. The determination of when competing values in-
fringe unduly upon those protected by the "due process" clauses is
a question largely of policy. It is, therefore, idle to criticize the
courts for invading the field of policy in deciding "due process"
cases. There is nothing else that they can do as long as the
doctrine prevails that these clauses limit the subject matter of
legislation. This might as well be frankly recognized by all con-
cerned. It is not the purpose to discuss generally the values pro-
tected by those clauses. Those thereby protected against undue
infringement through price control have already been stated in so
far as derivable from decisions to date. It remains to determine
the principles that will probably govern their expansion or modifi.
cation; and these can be developed only by considering the funda-
mental factors in the problem of price control.
The "due process" clauses give a measurable constitutional pro-
tection to individualism. Price control limits individual freedom
in a field which will probably continue to be consideredfor an in-
definite period a rather important sphere of individual activity.
It has thus far generally aimed to keep prices down to a level
deemed fair or just, andhas seldom been consciously adopted as a
device for modifying the ultimate distribution of economic prod-
ucts, or for giving direction to the community's economic powers.
These are, however, the practically inevitable effects of price fix-
ing. To fix prices involves something more than merely determin-
ing what buyers shall pay; it is equally significant in determining
who shall buy. It prevents those of superior wealth from exclud-
101 Waite, Public Policy and Personal Opinion (1921) 19 MicI. L. REY.
265; see also Waite, Judicial Statesmen (1922) 8 A. B. A. JouR. 375. For
an extensive general discussion of the "due process" clause see Kales,
"Due Process," the Inarticulate Major Premise and the Adamson Act
(1917) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 519.
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ing from the class of buyers those of lesser economic power by
preventing the former from bidding up the price to the point
where the latter cannot afford to buy. It is essentially as much
a limit on the buyers as on the producers, although this aspect
usually escapes attention because the buyers do not ordinarily
complain of prices fixed below what they would be willing to pay.
It is in connection with the rent cases that the effect of price fidng
upon the distribution of the social product appears most clearly.
Its character as a factor in determining the channels into which
the community's economic powers shall be directed is expressly
recognized in defining the rate of return that must be allowed if
rates are not to be held confiscatory. The really significant social
fact about prices is that they are factors in those distributive pro-
cesses. The formulation of any rational theory of price control
must take account of those relationships. The "due process"
clauses do not protect that particular distribution of the social
product and of the community's economic powers which results
from permitting complete individual freedom in fixing prices.
Every case sustaining price fixing negatives it, even though not
justified on that basis. The rather common provisions as to
certificates of convenience and necessity limit individual freedom
in directing economic forces. It is not a constitutionally pro-
tected privilege of those able to afford it to waste a commodity,
even when that entails the total sacrifice of more important wants.
The functioning of unregulated prices may produce that very
result. The values actually realized in a given society, and the
order of importance assigned to them, are to some extent func-
tions of these distributive processes, whether as causes or effects
it is unnecessary to decide. It is only necessary to recognize that
the price system is an important factor in creating a social order,
and that the actual order that competitive individualism has
produced shows many instances of overemphasizing some values
and underestimating others. This statement assumes a social
ideal and would involve circular reasoning if the purpose were
completely to define that standard. That, however, is not the aim
of the present discussion; its chief purpose is to maintain the
thesis that, given the admittedly dynamic character of the social
ideal, the modifications of that now assumed by the courts in deal-
ing with price control can and should be determined only by
recognizing the social function and results of the price system.
The adoption of that approach should make it clear that there
are values that the state may protect through price fixing other
than those concerned in maintaining a fair relation between prices
and costs. There is no logical reason to prevent its use to equal-
ize the opportunities for acquiring necessities by preventing the
economically strong from bidding the economically weak out of
the market, or to secure a more effective utilization of natural
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resources and economic power. The probability that such uses
of price fixing will be sustained will be enhanced if the traditional
approach to the problem is abandoned in favor of the more
rational one here contended for.
The field within which price control is valid can never be de-
fined with the exactness which characterizes a mathematica,
formula. The problem is, in a sense, insoluble; but it should at
least be stated so as not to conceal its real character. Its adequate
consideration requires a grasp of the nature of the judgment thah
courts make in deciding questions of that character. It is only
by stressing the fact that they are determining the scale of values
that society may make effective through law that its consideration
can be freed from the deadening effects of such phrases a,
"affected with a public interest" or "social justice". Courts can-
not, in defining the field of price control, escape the necessity or
formulating some theory as to the desirable distribution of wealth
and economic powers. They cannot do that without constructing
a scale of values by reference to which they can adjudge the desir-
ability or undesirability of given results. They do this whether
they sustain or deny the validity of price fixing. The conscious
recognition of this process is the sine qua non to the consideration
of the problem in terms of the realities involved, and to the dis-
covery of the lines of analysis that will have to be followed unless
it is to continue enmeshed in the tangles of meaningless generali-
ties.
